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Abstract
The context of an operational description is given by
the distinction between what we consider as relevant
and what as irrelevant for a particular experiment or
observation. A rigorous description of a context in
terms of a mathematically formulated context-inde-
pendent fundamental theory is possible by the re-
striction of the domain of the basic theory and the in-
troduction of a new coarser topology. Such a new
topology is never given by first principles, but de-
pends in a crucial way on the abstractions made by the
cognitive apparatus or the pattern recognition devices
used by the experimentalist. A consistent mathemati-
cal formulation of a higher-level theory requires the
closure of the restriction of the basic theory in the
new contextual topology. The validity domain of the
so constructed higher-level theory intersects nontriv-
ially with the validity domain of the basic theory:
neither domain is contained in the other. Therefore,
higher-level theories cannot be totally ordered and
theory reduction is not transitive. The emergence of
qualitatively new properties is a necessary conse-
quence of such a formulation of theory reduction
(which does not correspond to the traditional one).
Emergent properties are not manifest on the level of
the basic theory, but they can be derived rigorously by
imposing new, contextually selected topologies upon
context-independent first principles.
Most intertheoretical relations are mathematically
describable as singular asymptotic expansions which
do not converge in the topology of the primary the-
ory, or by choosing one of the infinitely many possi-
ble, physically inequivalent representations of the
primary theory (Gelfand–Naimark–Segal-construc-
tion of algebraic quantum mechanics). As examples
we discuss the emergence of shadows, inductors,
capacitors and resistors from Maxwell’s electrody-
namics, the emergence of order parameters in statisti-
cal mechanics, the emergence of mass as a classical
observable in Galilei-relativistic theories, the emer-
gence of the shape of molecules in quantum mechan-
ics, the emergence of temperature and other classical
observables in algebraic quantum mechanics.
Introduction
The problem of emergence in the exact natural sci-
ences is related to the problem of reductionism.
Philosophers of science usually consider reduction as
a logical relation between theories, and they focus on
the deducibility of one theory from another.1 How-
ever, there exists not a single physically well-founded
and nontrivial example for theory reduction in the
sense of  Hempel & Oppenheim (1948), Kemeny &
Oppenheim (1956), Oppenheim & Putnam (1958),
or Nagel (1961). The ideas discussed by these
philosophers rest on much too simple a view about
the structure of scientific theories describing the
physical world. The standard examples for reduction
and emergence discussed by the philosophers are
usually taken from physical sciences, but they do not
fulfill the legitimate requirements of conceptual and
mathematical rigor of physics. The link between
fundamental and higher-level theories is far more
complex than presumed by most philosophers.
1
   For example, Nagel (1961), p.352, defines: “A reduc-
tion is effected when the experimental laws of the sec-
ondary science (and if it has an adequate theory, its theory
as well) are shown to be logical consequences of the theo-
retical assumptions (inclusive of the coordinating defini-
tions) of the primary science.” More reasonable variants
require only that the higher-level theory can be deduced
from the basic theory together with appropriate initial and
boundary conditions, together with so-called “bridge
laws” conditions. However, all these variants are not well-
defined and of no use for a scientist.
First example: The link between chemistry and
physics is not a logical relation
In their famous paper on reductionism, Kemeny and
Oppenheim write: “… a great part of classical chem-
istry has been reduced to atomic physics.” 2 No refer-
ences for a proof are given. Evidently, the authors have
no idea what they are claiming. For example: How are
the non-linear differential equations of chemical kinet-
ics derived from linear equations of motion of quantum
mechanics? Or: What is the relation between chemically
pure substances (like liquid water) and molecules (like
H O2 , (H O)2 2 , (H O)2 3 , …)? Most certainly liquid
water is not simply composed of molecules H O2 . The
definition “substance x is chemically pure if and only
if x is composed exclusively of either atoms or
molecules of a single species or kind”, as proposed by
Mario Bunge3 is not only factually untenable. It also
represents a classical category mistake since it tries to
explain the purity concept used for chemical sub-
stances by the purity concept relevant for a category
of a different logical type.4
Second example: The link between thermodynamics
and mechanics is not a logical relation
Kemeny and Oppenheim maintain: “… the classical
theory of heat has been reduced to statistical
mechanics.”5 Moreover, Ernest Nagel 6 claims that
the concept of temperature can be reduced to statistical
mechanics by a mere definition, namely by the mean
kinetic energy   #kT  of gas molecules. This example –
cited again and again by philosophers7 – shows an
incredible ignorance of the most elementary concepts
of physics. Clearly, temperature is not a mechanical or
molecular concept.8 It is defined via the fundamental
zeroth principle of thermodynamics: if two systems
are both in equilibrium with a third system then
they are in equilibrium with each other. Systems
fulfilling this highly nontrivial transitivity relation
“have a property in common, namely the property of
being in thermal equilibrium with each other. This
property is called temperature.”9 It is plain that the
zeroth principle cannot be derived from the principles
of mechanics. Just as uninformed is the view of
Lawrence Sklar that we have to “discard the thermo-
dynamic notions of temperature and entropy.” He
claims: “The classical thermodynamics of Clausius,
Kelvin and Carathéodory is simply an incorrect theory
of the word. And not merely incorrect in a simple
‘numerical’ way, in which it is, in some sense, concep-
tually sound but just a little off in some predicted val-
ues. It is a ‘conceptually incorrect’ theory.”1 0
2   Kemeny & Oppenheim (1956), p.7.
3
   Bunge (1985), p.225.
4
   A correct discussion of the purity concept of chemical
substances is anything but simple and hard to be found in in
the literature. A most illuminating discussion is contained in
the lectures on thermostatics by van der Waals (1927), §5,
§92, §93.
5   Kemeny & Oppenheim (1956), p.7.
6   Nagel (1961), chapt.11.
7
   Compare for example Bunge (1973), pp.182–183, or
Scheibe (1988), p.155.
8
   Compare also Feyerabend (1962).
9
   Guggenheim (1949), p.6. See also Born (1921), §2.
10
 Sklar (1976). The quotations are from p.30 and p.16.
These examples show that for a sensible discussion of
the difficult problem of theory reduction we have to
avoid handweaving arguments. So we require that a
higher-level theory has to be deduced rigorously and
completely from a basic theory, indicating within the
adopted mathematical formalism precisely all nec-
essary auxiliary conditions. Such a course of action is
worth the effort since it turns out that emergence
and theory reduction are related.
Even in the most recent and very careful exposition
of the logical reduction of physical theories, Erhard
Scheibe (1997) misses the opportunity to discuss the
close relationship between reduction and emergence.
For example, while his (unnecessarily simplified)
discussion of the motion of electrons in the Coulomb
field of nuclei with an almost fixed position is cor-
rect, it is restricted to the trivial comparison of the
exact and approximative eigenvalues of the energy11.
If theory reduction is related to a mature and fully
mathematically formulated theory (in contrast to
particular theoretical problems), then a mathemati-
cally rigorous discussion puts in evidence its singular
character. Scheibe’s example then turns out to be
based on a singular asymptotic expansion which natu-
rally leads to symmetry breaking and the emergence
of qualitatively new properties. In molecular physics
and chemistry such a procedure is well known under
the name Born–Oppenheimer picture.12 From a phys-
ical point of view the crucial point of a Born–Oppen-
heimer description is not a simplification of the
mathematical problem, but the replacement of the
basic theory by a related but qualitatively new one.
Since nonconvergent singular asymptotic expansions
usually yield very accurate numerical values, the fact
that the new higher level theory has only approxi-
mate validity is often unimportant.
Intrinsic and operational
descriptions
According to George Spencer-Brown every descrip-
tion is based on the primitive act of a distinction.13 A
distinction splits the a universe of discourse into two
parts and generates the fundamental duality of inside
and outside.14 A distinction allows an indication: the
11
 Scheibe (1997), p.215–218.
12
 Born & Oppenheimer (1927).
13
 Spencer-Brown (1969). Compare also Varela
(1979), chapt.11.
14
 A review on inside/outside concepts in physics,
philosophy and cognitive science can be found in
Atmanspacher & Dalenoort (1994).
valuation and marking of the two distinct parts.
Every distinction has a purpose but no a priori mean-
ing: “There can be no distinction without motive, and
there can be no motive unless contents are seen to dif-
fer in value.”15 In our context, we denote the distinct
but interlocked parts as object and environment. Such
a distinction creates a frame of reference, necessary
for any kind of cognition and description. As
Suzanne Langer observed “Our world ‘divides into
facts’ because we so divide it.”16 For physical theo-
ries we may rephrase this statement as follows: the
distinction inside/outside is not covered by the most
fundamental context-independent natural laws (first
principles of physics).
If we observe certain aspects of reality, we inevi-
tably have to ignore certain other aspects of it so that
every recognition of particular features has to be paid
for by a loss of other features. Different points of
view correspond to different abstractions. Concepts
are introduced by neglecting elements that are
considered as nonessential, and by accentuating fea-
tures which are considered as essential for the chosen
investigation. There exist mutually exclusive abstrac-
tions which provide alternative descriptions of the
very same system. Such incompatible descriptions are
not logically contradictory because they refer to dif-
ferent abstractions and pattern recognition methods.
The first principles of physics are intended to have
universal validity and to give – as far as possible or
reasonable – a context-independent description of the
material world. Such an intrinsic description makes
no reference to other physical systems. It is not oper-
ational since every operationally meaningful descrip-
tion we can give requires the abstractions from irrel-
evant features. By contrast, an operational descrip-
tion refers to empirical observations obtained by
some pattern recognition methods which concentrate
on those aspects we consider as relevant. If we isolate
a phenomenon and assign individuality to it, we create
an entity which we call a pattern. Put pointedly: “A
pattern is something which somebody recognizes as a
pattern.”17
Recognition of patterns is an activity both in living
and in technical systems. What is rejected as irrele-
vant is neither determined by subjective beliefs nor by
physical laws. In living systems it is determined by
the historical biological evolution, in technical sys-
tems by design principles. In both cases, patterns are
15 Spencer-Brown (1969), p.1.
16 Langer (1942), p.273.
17
 Giuliano (1967).
created by rejecting irrelevant information. Since
there exist no unprejudiced sense data or unbiased ob-
servations without data processing, pattern recogni-
tion is not a purely logical process. Observable pat-
terns of the world do not exist in themselves. They
come into being only through abstractions and con-
textual symmetry breakings. Yet, patterns do not
arise like bolts from the blue. They reflect some
structural features of the intrinsic reality. A phe-
nomenological theory cannot be related directly to a
fundamental theory since observable patterns depend
on both the intrinsic properties of the world and the
abstractions associated with the pattern recognition
procedure. Besides of first principles, one has in addi-
tion use the very same abstractions as the pattern
recognition methods of empirical science do.
This situation implies that the interrelations
between intrinsic and operational descriptions are
highly nontrivial. First principles are always exceed-
ingly remote from our everyday experience –  they
cannot be deduced directly from experiments. The
historical development of physics establishes that
symmetry is an effective criterion for selecting first
principles. On the other hand, all phenomenological
theories are context-dependent, they cannot be
deduced from context-independent first principles
without taking into consideration the abstractions
evoked by the pattern recognition devices necessary
for the observation of phenomena. If one disregards
this essential difference between context-independent
fundamental laws and the context-dependent opera-
tional descriptions, one can hardly avoid Bas van
Fraassen’s conclusion that we should discard the
idea that there are “laws of nature”18, or Nancy
Cartwright’s verdict that “the fundamental laws of
physics do not describe true facts about reality”, and
that “the fundamental laws patently do not get the
facts right”, but that “phenomenological laws are
indeed true of the objects in reality”.19 The referents
of fundamental laws and of phenomenological theo-
ries are categorically different: fundamental theories
refer to the independent reality, while phenomeno-
logical theories refer to empirical reality.20 Nonethe-
less, there exist most fertile relations between con-
text-independent and context-dependent theories.
18
 Van Fraassen (1989).
19
 Cartwright (1983). The quotations are from
p.54, p.3, and p.4.
20
 The concepts “independent reality” and “empirical
reality” have been introduced Bernard d’Espagnat.
Compare for example D’Espagnat (1995), chapters 14
and 15.
On the topological characterization
of a context
Provided we can describe precisely what we consider
as relevant and what as irrelevant, what our deliber-
ate lack of interest is, then we can add the very same
abstractions to the fundamental first principles. In a
mathematical description this additional information
requires some concept of nearness which in turn leads
to a topological structure.21 Topology is the study of
continuity within the framework of mathematics. Its
objective is to investigate those properties of mathe-
matical objects that are preserved under one-to-one
bicontinuous transformations (so called homeomor-
phisms). Bicontinuous transformations map neigh-
boring points into neighboring points, while distinct
points are not crushed together.
Let   j  map a set   V  into another set   ′V . Let p  be a
point in   V  and let   ′p p: j ( )  be the corresponding
point in   ′V . Then the mapping   j  is said to be continu-
ous if the points near to p  map into points near to ′p .
That is, a mapping is continuous if it preserves near-
ness. The notion of nearness is not intrinsic, it is
defined by specifying a topological structure (often
simply called a topology), defined by specifying the
neighborhood of each point. In topology a point is
said to be “near” to a set if the point is in the set or is
a limit point of the set. In the latter case one says that
the point belongs to the closure of this set. A topo-
logical space is a set with a topology imposed on it.
More precisely, a topological space is a set   V  (whose
elements are called points) and a function (called
closure) assigning to each set   X ⊂ V  a set   X ⊂ V
satisfying the axioms   X X⊂ ,   X Y X Y∪ = ∪ ,
∅ = ∅ , and   X X= . On a given set there can exist
many distinct topologies, so that we may wish to
compare them. To this end, we introduce a partial
order into the class of all topologies on   V . We say
that a topology with the closure function   X X→  is
finer than that given by the closure function   X X→
′
if   X X⊂
′
 for each   X ⊂ V . It is called coarser if
  X X⊃
′
 for each   X ⊂ V .
22
 Since there are topolo-
gies which cannot be compared, the class of all topol-
ogies cannot be totally ordered.
In a mathematically formalized theory a context
can be introduced by choosing a new coarser contex-
tual topology which is compatible with the finer
topology of the more fundamental theory. This new
21
 Compare Herrlich (1974), Cameron, Hocking &
Naimpally (1974).
22
 Compare Kuratowski (1966), §4 and §13.
topology is never given a priori but depends in a cru-
cial way on the abstractions made by the cognitive
apparatus or the pattern recognition devices used by
the experimentalist. The closure of such a higher-
level description in the chosen contextual topology
generates new context-dependent features which are
not already present in the fundamental description. In
this mathematically precise sense, one can speak of the
emergence of novelty in descriptions of a higher
level. The phenomenological theories corresponding
to different branches of empirical science can be re-
lated to one and the same basic theory by introducing
appropriate contextual topologies. The richness and
variety of the phenomenological theories are due to
the myriads of possibilities to choose coarser contex-
tual topologies compatible with the topology of the
underlying fundamental theory.
Given the contextual topology corresponding to a
phenomenological description, the corresponding
phenomenological theory can rigorously be derived
from a more fundamental theory. Thereby, the speci-
fication of the context is at least as important as the
first principles. If the derived theory would not be
closed in the new contextual topology, the validity
domain of the derived theory would be contained in
the validity domain of the basic theory. To get a
mathematically complete and consistent theory, one
has to close the derived theory in the new topology.
The result is that the validity domain of the derived
theory and of the basic theory intersects nontrivially.
Neither domain is contained in the other. Although
higher-level theories can be derived rigorously from a
more fundamental theory, they are not subtheories of
the basic theory. Therefore, higher-level theories can-
not be totally ordered, and theory reduction is not
transitive.23
Asymptotic descriptions
One of the most powerful tools to introduce new
contextual descriptions is the use of singular asymp-
totic expansions.24 An asymptotic expansion depicts
23
 The traditional view claims the contrary. For example
Steven Weinberg (1988) takes “for granted a kind of
transitivity. If a large number of experimental facts a, b, c,
… are explained by a set of theories X, Y, … , and then
these theories are in turn explained by a more satisfying
theory Z, then I would say that the facts a, b, c, … are
explained by theory Z even though we already understood
them in terms of the previous theories X, Y, … .” For a
more detailed discussion of the nontransitivity of general
theory reductions, compare Primas (1977).
24
 A similar point of view has been discussed by
Michael Berry (1995).
the behavior of a function near the boundary of its
domain of definition. For example, we may be inter-
ested in the behavior of an analytic function   z f za ( )
as z → ∞ . If f  has a removable singularity or a pole,
this behavior is trivial. Nontrivial asymptotic expan-
sions deal with functions that have either an essential
singularity at infinity or are defined merely in some
angular region extending to infinity. A divergent
series 
  
f f z f z f z0 1 1 2 2 3 3+ + + +− − − L is said to be a
asymptotic expansion of a function   z f za ( ) if for
every   n = 0 1 2, , , L
  
lim ( )[ ]
z
n
n
nz f z f f z f z f z
→ ∞
− − −
− − − − − =h j0 1 1 2 2 0L
for n  fixed, even though
  
lim ( )[ ]
n
n
n
nz f z f f z f z f z
→ ∞
− − −
− − − − − = ∞h j0 1 1 2 2 L
for z  fixed. When this is the case, we can make
 
  
_ _z f z f f z f z f zn n n[ ]( ) − − − − −− − −0 1 1 2 2 L
arbitrarily small by taking   _ _z  sufficiently large. One
then writes   f z f zn n n( ) ; Σ =∞ −0  and says that the se-
ries is a singular asymptotic expansion of the function
  z f za ( ) for z → ∞  in the sense of Poincaré.25
Many intertheoretical relations can be mathemati-
cally described by asymptotic expansions. Singular
asymptotic expansions are never uniformly conver-
gent in the intrinsic topology of the basic theory. This
nonuniformity is not a disaster but an indication that
the limiting case represents a caricature, suppressing
irrelevant details and enhancing contextually rele-
vant features. The discontinuous change in the limit
leads to a discontinuous change in the semantics and
therewith to a description in a new language in terms
of emergent properties. In the same sense as a photo-
graph can never replace a brilliant caricature, an
asymptotic description can – for the intended purpose
– be more adequate than the exact description.
A singular asymptotic expansion depends on a
parameter (or several parameters) so that the descrip-
tion behaves nonuniformly as the parameter tends
towards some limiting value. For a consistent new
description one seeks a uniformly valid reformula-
tion. Such a regularization of a singular asymptotic
description often requires a rescaling of the time vari-
able. A powerful analytic tool to achieve this goal is
the so-called multiple-time-scale perturbation the-
ory.26 The essence of this method is the rescaling of
the relevant observables together with the time vari-
able. If the singular asymptotic expansion can be
formulated with respect to a dimensionless positive
25
 Poincaré (1886).
26
 Compare for example Nayfeh (1973), chapter 6.
parameter   e  (  e = ↓−z 1 0 ), one can replace the original
time variable t  by a “fast time”   t :0 t , a “slow
time”   t : e1 t , a still “slower time”   t : e2
2 t , and so
on. The time dependence of a physical quantity X  can
then be written in the rescaled form as
  
X t X
X X
( ) ( , , , )
( , , , ) ( , , , ) ,
=
+ + +
0 0
0 0
1 2
1 1 2
2
2 1 2
t t t
e t t t e t t t
L
L L L
where   t 0 ,   t1 ,   t 2 , … are considered as independent vari-
ables so that the time derivative of X t( )  is given by
  
∂
∂ =
∂
∂ +
∂
∂ +
∂
∂


+
∂
∂ +
∂
∂ +
∂
∂


+
X t
t
X X X
X X X
( )
.
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
2
2
1
1
t
e
t t
e
t t t
L
The requirement that the multiple-time expansion is
uniformly valid for all times (no “secular terms” in
the language of astronomers) leads to a hierarchy of
equations of motion for the rescaled quantities X 0 ,
X1 , X2 , … and therewith to a hierarchical structure
characterized by different characteristic time scales.
Often, the separation of time scales is of fundamental
importance to understand a complex system. How-
ever, it would not be correct to say that the system is
structured hierarchically. It is the new viewpoint
with its associated abstractions which generates the
higher levels of a hierarchical description. The task of
higher-level descriptions is not to approximate the
fundamental theory but to represent new patterns of
reality.
Atomism is not the proper starting
point for theory reduction
Present-day natural science is still strongly influ-
enced by atomism and tries to analyze the material
reality in terms of some elementary building blocks.
For example, discussing the relationship between
biology and the physical sciences, Franciso Ayala
maintains that a reductionist defends the position
“that organisms are ultimately made up of the same
atoms that make up inorganic matter, and of nothing
else.”27 However, the key ideas of reductionism and
atomism should not be muddled. Reductive atomism
is the dated belief that ultimately everything comes
down to the mechanics of independently existing
atoms. Typical for this view is the following state-
ment by Emil du Bois-Reymond of 1872:
“Denken wir uns alle Veränderungen in der
Körperwelt in Bewegungen von Atomen auf-
gelöst, die durch deren konstante Zentral-
27 Ayala (1983), p.526.
kräfte bewirkt werden, so wäre das Weltall
naturwissenschaftlich erkannt.”2 8
The historical idea that the material world is already
structured by some kind of interacting “atoms” is in
sharp contradiction to basic insights suggested by
quantum mechanics. According to quantum theory the
material world is a whole, a whole which is not made
out of independently existing parts. As a rule, sepa-
rated subsystems of a quantum system do not exist.29
Matter as described by first principles is not a sub-
stance but the carrier of patterns. Quarks, photons,
electrons, atoms, or molecules are not building
blocks, they are contextual objects without an inde-
pendent existence. Questions such as “Do organisms
exhibit properties other than those of their con-
stituent atoms and molecules?” 30 are ill-posed since
most certainly organisms are not made out of atoms
and molecules, even if it should turn out that all
properties of organisms can be explained in terms of
quantum mechanics. The assertions
• “something consists of elementary systems”,
• “something can be decomposed into
“elementary systems”,
• “something can be described in terms of
“elementary systems”,
are not equivalent. According to quantum mechanics
the first statement is almost always false, the second
one is often true, and the third one may be sensible.
Under appropriate conditions a material whole can be
described in terms of parts but there is a great variety
of feasible non-isomorphic decompositions of the
whole into parts. Non-isomorphic decomposition
lead to different descriptions, reflecting different
perspectives. That is, in quantum theory we are natu-
rally led to a multitude of inequivalent descriptions.
They are not only admissible, but they are equally
entitled and necessary. The proper choice is not given a
priori but depends on the chosen context.
Elementary systems (usually, but misleadingly
called “elementary particles”) are merely auxiliary
group-theoretically indecomposable structures with-
28
 Du Bois–Reymond (1872).
29
 From an operational viewpoint, two physical objects
are considered as separated if and only if an experiment
performed on one of the systems does not change the state
of the other systems. It is a mathematical property of classi-
cal mechanics that the individual states of the subsystems
of a physical system determine the individual state of the
whole system. This property is called separability. A
physical system is called holistic if it does not possess
the property of separability. Quantum mechanics is the first
mathematically formalized holistic theory we know of.
30 Ayala (1983), p.525.
out any direct ontological meaning. They are just con-
ceptual carriers of ergodic representations of the
appropriate kinematical symmetry group (like the
group SU(3), the Poincaré group, or the Galilei
group). In the jargon of quantum mechanics such
group-theoretically defined elementary systems are
called bare systems, they are idealized as objects
without an environment – a quite outrageous and
incongruous theoretical construct. At least such bare
systems have no operational meaning. A bare elemen-
tary system carrying a mass and an electrical charge
(like a bare electron) inevitably interacts with the
gravitational and the electromagnetic field generated
by itself.
The state representing an electron as actually
observed in the laboratory is called a dressed elec-
tron, it has a very complicated structure. Without an
appropriate concept of an environmental background
the concept of an individual quantum object makes no
operational sense. Heuristically, a dressed electron
can be thought of as consisting of the bare electron,
interacting with its own radiation field by emitting
and reabsorbing virtual photons. The presence of a
virtual cloud does not only modify the properties of
the bare elementary system and its bare environment,
but also its dynamics. A dressed object is not only
adapted to its environment. Its individuality emerges
as by the interplay with the environment. This applies
to electrons as well as other objects such as atoms and
molecules.
First example:
Shadows, inductors, and capacitors
in Maxwell’s electrodynamics
Singular asymptotic expansions are always mathe-
matically very delicate, but if executed properly they
may lead to amazing insights which are outside the
scope of ad hoc approximations. The necessary stan-
dard of mathematical rigor has been set by Kurt O.
Friedrichs (1955) with his general analysis of
asymptotic phenomena in mathematical physics.
When a light wave passes an object, a typical dis-
continuity – called the shadow – can be observed.
However, in Maxwell’s electrodynamics – the fun-
damental theory for the propagation of light – shad-
ows do not exist. Maxwell’s electrodynamics is gov-
erned by partial differential equations which have
only continuous solutions. The discontinuities associ-
ated with shadows appear only in geometric optics,
the limiting case of vanishing wavelength   l ,   l → 0 .
An appropriate asymptotic expansion of the Max-
well equation with the expansion parameter   e l=
is discontinuous at   e = 0, leading to the pattern
“shadow”. The boundary of the shadow is an emer-
gent pattern of this singular asymptotic description.
In the fundamental Maxwell theory there is just a
continuous transition from light to darkness which
takes place across a very narrow strip along the
shadow boundary of geometric optics.
It would be misleading to consider geometric op-
tics just as an approximation to Maxwell’s electro-
dynamics. These two theories are related but quali-
tatively different. The task of geometric optics is not
to approximate Maxwell’s electrodynamics but to
describe optical phenomena in terms of the higher-
level language of geometry. In many respects geomet-
ric optics is much more powerful than the more
fundamental electrodynamics of Maxwell. Tradi-
tional geometric optics is the standard tool for the
construction of optical instruments. It is described by
the leading term in the asymptotic short-wavelength
expansion. Diffraction effects are not included in
geometric optics, but they are taken care of in the
higher order terms of the asymptotic expansion. The
asymptotic description by geometric optics is not just
a convenient tool in the mathematical analysis of
light. Friedrichs writes:
“On the one hand, discontinuities appear to play a
secondary role, namely when they are consid-
ered as approximate descriptions of continuous
phenomena involving quick transitions. On the
other hand, discontinuities play a primary role.
For, the experimental description of nature and
the theoretical description based on it involves
objects with more or less sharp outlines.
Therefore, nature could not be described in this
way if natural objects did not possess sharp
outlines, i.e. discontinuities. In other words, the
quantities employed to describe nature could
not even be defined if discontinuities did not
occur. In this sense, discontinuities appear to
play a primary role. It may be debated whether
or not this situation involves a vicious or a
nonvicious circle. In any case, one may say that
asymptotic description is not just a matter of
imperfection, but is an essential element in the
mathematical description of nature.”3 1
While geometric optics is the first term of a high-
frequency asymptotic expansion of Maxwell’s equa-
tions around the singular point   n = ∞ ,   n : lcy , elec-
trical network theory arises as a low-frequency
31 Friedrichs (1955), pp.495–496.
asymptotic expansion around the singular point
  n = 0 . The concept of a voltage difference as used in
electrical circuit theory is defined in terms of field
quantities if and only if the field is electrostatic, oth-
erwise the line integral of the electric field intensity
is dependent on the path of integration. Such electric
fields, characterized by a vanishing energy loss by
radiation, are called quasi-static. They are described by
neglecting of the displacement current   ∂ ∂Dy t  in the
Maxwell equation   =@H J D= + ∂ ∂y t  for the mag-
netic induction field vector H . For electrical net-
works the vector current density J  is a function of
the electric field vector E , J J E= ( ) . Many media
are isotropic, homogeneous and linear so that
throughout a wide range of conditions Ohm’s law
may be assumed,   J E= s , where the scalar   s  is the
conductivity of the medium. If a typical length   l  of
the system is small compared to the wavelength   cyn ,
the propagation delay   lyc  is an irrelevant factor.
Under these conditions Kirchhoff’s laws for electri-
cal networks can be derived from Maxwell’s equa-
tions by going to the limit of infinitely thin conduc-
tors (wires). It is not trivial, but possible to find in a
mathematically rigorous way a singular asymptotic
expansion of Maxwell’s electrodynamics with the
expansion parameter   e n= , whose dominant term is
characterized by the equation of motion of electrical
circuit theory.32 The network elements are character-
ized by the differential equations   vL LL d j dt= y ,
  j C d dtC C= v y ,   vR RR j= , where   vL ,   vC ,   vR are the
voltages across the network elements, and jL , jC , jL
the currents through the network elements. The
constant L  is called the self inductance of the emer-
gent circuit element “inductor”, the constant C  is
called the capacitance of the emergent circuit element
“capacitor”, while the constant R is called the resis-
tance of the emergent circuit element “resistor”.
Second example: Phase transitions
and order parameters
It is well known that a theoretical description of
phase transitions is possible in terms of statistical
mechanics. In the basic microscopic description the
interactions are translation and rotation invariant and
given by gauge fields. The correct description of phase
transitions requires the spontaneous breakdowns of
some of the mentioned symmetries. For example, fer-
romagnetism involves the spontaneous breakdown of
32
 Compare for example Magid (1972), chapter 9;
 Carey & O’Brien (1986).
the rotation symmetry, crystallization realizes the
spontaneous breakdown of the translation and rota-
tion symmetry, superfluidity is related to the break-
down of the special Galilei symmetry, while super-
conductivity is connected with the spontaneously
broken gauge symmetry. However, it can be proved
that both in classical and in quantum mechanics phase
transitions and spontaneously broken symmetries
exist only for systems having infinitely many degrees
of freedom. It has been argued that actual physical
systems have only finitely many degrees of freedom
so that one may ask why in a theoretical description
we should use infinite systems.
An analogous question could be posed in electron-
ics: why do we not restrict ourselves to networks
with finitely many resistors, capacitors and induc-
tors, but discuss transmission lines in terms of trans-
fer functions with line singularities? Or even in arith-
metic: why do we not restrict ourselves to a finite
number system? The answer is: In many respects the
infinite is simpler than the very large but finite.
Usually the mathematical discussion of physical phe-
nomena is based on the uncountably infinite set of real
numbers. For all practical purposes such an analysis
gives results which are physically equivalent to a
computer calculation based on a large but finite num-
ber system. However, a transfinite analysis is much
simpler. For example, a circle is much simpler to be
characterized than an approximating polygon with
very many edges.
If one tries to describe macroscopic systems in
terms of Hamiltonian mechanics of a microscopic
system with very many mechanical degrees of free-
dom, one is confronted with a severe conceptual diffi-
culty. It turns out that the exact description of sys-
tems with myriads of degrees of freedom is not
robust. That is, if we start with a finite system with
N  degrees of freedom and make N  larger and larger,
some expectation values become extremely sensitive
with respect to small changes of the model or to very
small external perturbations. If the mathematical
model for the system is not robust, it deteriorates
qualitatively for small deviations from a chosen
model. Therefore the environment of a macroscopic
system can never be left out of consideration, and one
has to consider open systems.
The inclusion of the interactions with the environ-
ment can have dramatic qualitative effects such as
symmetry breakdown and the emergence of qualita-
tively new properties. However, these interactions
and the state of the environment are never precisely
known. Fortunately, perfectly detailed information
is unnecessary to get a robust description. Nonrobust
models can be investigated with Bogoliubov’s
method of quasi-averages.33 One considers an expecta-
tion value   Æ æ eA N V,  of an observable A  of a system
with N  degrees of freedom and the Hamiltonian
  H V+ e . Here H  is the Hamiltonian of the object
under study and   e V  (  e > 0 ) is an arbitrary external
perturbation. The physically correct limit for a very
large number of degrees of freedom is then taken to be
  lim lim ,e eÆ æ→ →∞0 N N VA . Usually this limit
depends in a critical way on the choice of the perturba-
tion V , and it is different from the unphysical limit
  lim lim ,N N VA→∞ →e eÆ æ0 . Different perturbations
lead to different limits, but none of them are a priori
distinguished. Depending on the choice of the arbitrar-
ily small perturbation one gets as a rule infinitely
many physically inequivalent representations with
the associated qualitatively new features. Since ro-
bustness is a continuity property, the proper choice of
one of the many inequivalent representations is tan-
tamount to a selection of a contextual topology. The
introduction of a new contextual topology regular-
izes the Hamiltonian model and generates a new level
of description.
For infinite systems phase transitions are perfectly
sharp. Such an idealized description fits the experi-
mental data well but should be considered just as the
first term of an asymptotic description. For example,
ferromagnets show a second-order phase transition
which is idealized as a singularity at the critical Curie
temperature TCurie . In this description, for T T< Curie
there is a spontaneous magnetization which decreases
with increasing temperature and vanishes at the Curie
temperature TCurie  Moreover, the magnetization has a
precisely defined distinguished direction so that one
speaks of a spontaneous symmetry breaking. In a more
realistic description one has to turn to a thermody-
namic theory of large but finite systems which can be
expressed by an asymptotic expansion of the thermo-
dynamic functions. For example, the Gibbs free
energy G  may have an asymptotic expansion of the
form34
  
G P T N
g P T N a P T N b P T N
( , , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ln ,
=
+ + + …3 2y
where N  is the number of molecules. The first term
is the free energy in the limit N → ∞  in the proper
contextual topology. The second term may be a sur-
face energy. The additional terms of the order   N3 2y
33
 Bogoliubov (1970).
34
 Hill (1963).
or ln N  will be noticeable at phase transitions and are
the reason why phase transitions are not completely
sharp but blurred by fluctuations. Such soft phase
transitions are linked to approximate order parame-
ters. Although for finite systems the traditional
thermodynamic concepts of “phase transition”,
“order parameter” and “symmetry breakdown” be-
come somewhat fuzzy, they are qualitatively signifi-
cant for large enough N . Thus, by idealizations we
can establish qualitatively new phenomena (e.g. phase
transitions) and qualitatively new properties (e.g. or-
der parameters) which are appropriate for the descrip-
tion of empirical phenomena. That is, in the appropri-
ate contextual topology one can approximate an infi-
nite system arbitrarily closely by a finite one.
Third example: The mass in
Galilei-relativistic theories
The transition from the more fundamental Lorentz-
relativistic quantum mechanics to Galilei-relativistic
quantum mechanics is governed by the contraction of
the Lorentz group to the Galilei group – a highly sin-
gular limit.35 While the Lorentz group is semisim-
ple, the Galilei group is not but has a more compli-
cated mathematical structure. The emergent quantity
associated with this contraction is the mass in the
sense of a classical observable (which commutes
with all other observables and can therefore be
treated as a real parameter). In traditional quantum
mechanics this result is known under the name univa-
lence superselection rule or Bargmann’s superselec-
tion rule which guarantees the strict conservation of
mass in Galilei-relativistic quantum theory.36 A sys-
tematic asymptotic expansion of Lorentz-relativistic
quantum mechanics in terms of powers of the inverse
velocity of light allows the inclusion of Lorentz-rel-
ativistic effects into the Galilei-relativistic picture.37
Fourth example: The shape of
molecules and the molecular
hierarchy
All molecular chemistry is based on the concept of
molecular structure. For example, every chemist
attributes to a benzene molecule in the ground state a
shape which is characterized by a planar nuclear frame
35
 Compare Inönü & Wigner (1953), Saletan (1961).
36
 Bargmann (1954). Compare also the lucid appendix 7
“If Galileo Had Known Quantum Mechanics” in
Kaempffer (1965).
37
 Compare Itoh (1965), deVries & Jonker (1968).
with the symmetry group D6 h . This pattern does not
exist in a full quantum-theoretical description since
electrons and nuclei are entangled by Einstein–
Podolsky–Rosen correlations. The concept of molec-
ular structure does not follow from first principles –
all molecules with the same empirical formula have
the same Schrödinger equation, so that, at this level,
the shape of a molecule as the main feature of molecu-
lar chemistry is simply not in evidence. In a quantum
theoretical description the molecular shape emerges
by abstracting from the actually existing Einstein–
Podolsky–Rosen correlations between the electrons
and the nuclei. Historically, the structure concept has
been introduced into quantum chemistry by the so-
called Born-Oppenheimer approximation.38 But this
terminology is misleading since the main issue is not
an approximation, but the breaking of a holistic
symmetry. A more proper appreciation of the Born–
Oppenheimer-description stresses its singular nature:
it is an expansion about the singular point of infinite
nuclear masses. An asymptotic expansion can be for-
mulated in terms of the ratio   e = ( )m My y1 4 , where
m  is the mass of an electron and M  is a mean nuclear
mass of the molecular system. In the limiting case
  e = 0  the holistic correlations between nuclei and
electrons are suppressed so the description of a
molecule reduces to the description of the motion of
electrons in the electric field of a classical nuclear
framework. In this description the molecular struc-
ture is a property described by an emergent classical
observable.39 The singular limiting case   e = 0  leads to
a discontinuous change in the description and is the
starting point for an asymptotic expansion in terms
of the emergent property at higher levels of descrip-
tion.
A mathematically rigorous formulation requires
the use of the method of multiple scales, a rescaling
of the nuclear masses and the nuclear momentum
operators.40 In the asymptotic expansion into powers
of the small parameter   e  the terms proportional to   e
and   e 3  vanish. The term proportional to   e 2  describes
the oscillation of the nuclear frame quantum-mechan-
ically. The term proportional to   e 4  describes the ro-
38
 Born & Oppenheimer (1927). For a modern version
which includes the induced non-Abelian Berry-type gauge
fields, compare the synoptic presentations by Bohm
(1993), chapter XXIII, and by Littlejohn & Reinsch
(1997).
39
 Compare Primas (1981), section 6.4.
40
 Compare Hagedorn (1980), Hagedorn (1986),
Hagedorn (1988), Kargol (1994).
tation of the nuclear frame quantum-mechanically.41
The asymptotic separation of time scales is the basis
of molecular spectroscopy. The electronic spectra
(typically in the visible and ultraviolet region) are
discussed on the time scale   t :0 t , the vibration spec-
tra (typically in the infrared region) are governed by
the slower time scale   t : e2
2 t , while the rotation
spectra (typically in the radio frequency region) have
to be discussed on the even slower time scale
  t : e4
4 t . This asymptotic expansion leads to a hier-
archic description of molecular dynamics.
In such dynamical hierarchies a level of description
is classified as a higher level if its reaction time is
much longer than that of a lower level. Moreover,
adjacent hierarchic levels are connected by a feedback
loop such that the lower level is subordinated by an
authority relation to the next higher level which con-
strains the behavior of the lower level in the sense of
some coherent activity. No hierarchic level can be
considered as an independent entity on its own right;
it exists only in virtue of the lower levels and has to
be described as a nonautonomous open system. If in a
dynamical hierarchic system a higher level acts
slowly enough, the subordinate lower levels can fol-
low so that we have a dynamically stable hierarchy.
However, a forced sudden change on a higher level
usually leads to a loss of hierarchic control and to
structural instabilities.
A “more exact” description without such a dynam-
ical hierarchy is, of course, possible but it would
leave many interesting phenomena out of evidence and
would be of no use to a chemist. The separation of
time scales and the distinction between short-term
and long-term memories is crucial for our attempts
to understanding the material world in simple terms.
Every hierarchic level has its own expressive natural
language which should not be eliminated in favor of a
universal language. The description of a higher level
with a language appropriate for a lower level may be
feasible but is highly impracticable since such a
description would be very complex and almost
incomprehensible.
Fifth example: Classical
observables in quantum theory
A fairly context-independent general formulation of
the first principles of physics can be expressed alge-
braically. The corresponding formalism of algebraic
41
 Compare Primas & Müller-Herold (1984),
chapter 4.
quantum mechanics is nothing but a mathematically
correct codification of the original ideas of quantum
theory. It is a general representation theory of the
basic kinematical symmetry group and the associated
canonical commutation relations. Given the appropri-
ate context, this general formulation allows a math-
ematically rigorous derivation of most physical phe-
nomenological theories such as traditional quantum
mechanics, quantum field theory, classical point me-
chanics, classical continuum mechanics, or statistical
mechanics.
In algebraic quantum mechanics one can formulate
the first principles (which are related to fundamental
symmetries) individually and non-probabilistically
in terms of an abstract C*-algebra   A , called the
algebra of intrinsic observables.42 A C*-algebra is a
topological algebra with the extraordinary property
that its topology (the so-called norm topology) is
determined algebraically. Hence the topology of a
C*-algebra is intrinsic and does not depend on any
context. The intrinsic properties are represented by
the selfadjoint elements of the C*-algebra   A . They
describe what is physically real independently of any
observation.
Considering only first principles of quantum
mechanics it is impossible to get any operational de-
scription of the material world. For example, funda-
mental symmetries are never directly accessible by
experiments, they can only retrospectively inferred
by contingent symmetry breakings. This fundamental
insight has been recognized clearly by Pierre Curie
(1894): “C’est la dissymétrie qui crée le phénomène.”
Every operational description requires a metatheoret-
ical “Archimedean point” which provides us with a
distinction separating an observed object from its en-
vironment and from observing tools. Without a divi-
sion of the world into a part “which sees” and a part
“which is seen” experimental science is not conceiv-
able. This division has to be introduced by the context
of inquiry, that is by our decision of what we consider
as relevant and what as irrelevant. In algebraic quan-
tum mechanics a particular context can be introduced
by imposing a new, contextually selected topology
upon the state space of the C*-algebra of intrinsic
observables with an intrinsic topology.
42
 A *-algebra is a collection of mathematical objects
  A B, ,L  that can be combined linearly, multiplied in a
bilinear and associative way, and mapped by the conjugate
linear *-operation A A→ ∗  which satisfies A A∗∗=  and
( )AB B A∗ ∗ ∗= . If a *-algebra   A  is endowed with a Banach-
space norm   __ __É  with the properties   __ __ __ ____ __AB A B≤  and
  __ __ __ __A A A
∗
=
2
, then   A  is called a C*-algebra.
A most interesting feature of algebraic quantum
mechanics is that it provides the mathematical tools
for the construction of an “Archimedean point”. A
new coarser, contextually selected topology can be
introduced by picking out a particular reference
state, given by a positive linear state functional   r on
the context-independent abstract C*-algebra   A  of
intrinsic observables. The so-called GNS-construc-
tion (according to Gelfand, Naimark and Segal) then
allows the construction of a context-dependent
Hilbert space   Hr  and an associated faithful represen-
tation   pr ( )A  of the C*-algebra   A  acting on   Hr .43
The closure of   pr ( )A  in the weak topology of the
algebra   B H( )r  of all bounded operators acting on
  Hr  is a context-dependent W*-algebra   Mr ,
  pr r r( ) ( )A M B H⊂ ⊂ , called the algebra of contex-
tual observables. Every W*-algebra is a C*-algebra,
but not every C*-algebra is closed in the coarser
W*-topology. The new contextual topology on   A
which is induced by the reference state functional   r
corresponds to the weak operator topology on
  pr r( ) ( )A B H⊂ . It reflects the continuity require-
ment necessary for a continuous representation of the
contingent initial conditions. That is, not all states on
the C*-algebra   A  of intrinsic observables are admis-
sible states for a contextual description in terms of
the W*-algebra   Mr  of contextual observables. A
contextual W*-algebra   Mr  is strictly larger than the
faithful representation   pr ( )A  of the C*-algebra   A
of intrinsic observables. That is, all intrinsic observ-
ables appear also as contextual observables, but in ad-
dition there are new observables which are not intrin-
sic. The observables in the W*-algebra   Mr  of contex-
tual observables, but not in the faithful representa-
tion   pr ( )A  of the C*-algebra   A  of intrinsic observ-
ables, are called emergent observables. They repre-
sent properties which are novel in the sense that they
are absent in the more fundamental context-indepen-
dent C*-algebraic description. The emergence of nov-
elty in contextual descriptions is a compelling conse-
quence of algebraic quantum theory.
The adopted ontology for the basic C*-algebraic
theory induces an operationally meaningful interpre-
tation in terms of statistical states which refer to our
knowledge of the state as it appears in the context-
independent description. Statistical states are repre-
sented by the normal positive linear functionals on
43
 For all mathematical questions we refer to Takesaki
(1979), chapter I, section 9.
the W*-algebra   Mr  of contextual observables.
4 4
Note that in a particular representation   pr  only a
small portion of the states on the algebra   A  of
intrinsic observables corresponds to operationally ac-
cessible   s -additive statistical states (i.e. to elements
of the predual   ( )Mr ∗ ). The contextually selected
topology is characterized by the fact that in the repre-
sentation   pr  the reference state   r  is the restriction of
an operationally accessible statistical state.
With the only exception of von Neumann’s codifi-
cation of traditional quantum mechanics (where the
basic C*-algebra is the algebra of compact operators),
there are always infinitely many physically inequiva-
lent W*-representations of the underlying basic
C*-algebra of intrinsic observables. Different inequi-
valent representations represent physically inequiva-
lent contextual descriptions of one and the same basic
system. They can be distinguished by classical ob-
servables which commute with all observables. Even
if the algebra   A  of intrinsic observables (hence also
  pr ( )A ) has no center, the contextually constructed
algebra   Mr  usually has a large center   Z Mr r( ) ,
  
Z M
M M
r r
r r
:( )
, ,h jZ Z Z M M Z M| ∈ = ∈for every
describing the classical features of the contextual
quantum system. The nontrivial selfadjoint operators
of the center   Z Mr r( )  are called classical observ-
ables. Most classical observables are emergent; they
are elements of   Z Mr r( )  but not elements of   pr ( )A .
Such emergent classical observables (like tempera-
ture or order parameters describing phase transitions)
are neither contained in the basic C*-algebra   A  nor
are they functions of the intrinsic observables. They
are generated by the basic C*-algebra   A  of intrinsic
observables together with a context which selects a
particular representation.
In the algebraic approach emergent properties are
not postulated but derived from contingent condi-
tions which are necessary to describe physical systems
besides the natural law. However, since there are
uncountably many inequivalent possibilities to intro-
44
 The   s -weak topology of a W*-algebra is of crucial
importance for the representation of statistical states. In
analogy to the concept of additivity of measure in classical
probability theory, a state functional   r ∈
∗M  is said to be
completely additive if it satisfies   r r( ) ( )∨ F Fn n n= o  for
every set   h jFn  of pairwise orthogonal projections
  Fn ∈P M( ) , F Fn m = 0  for n m≠ . In measure theory, the
additivity of a measure implies Lebesgue’s monotone con-
vergence theorem. In analogy, a state   r  is said to be nor-
mal when   r r( ) ( )M Mn ↑  for each monotonically increasing
net   h jMn  of operators Mn  in   M  with least upper bound M .
duce a consistent coarser contextual topology, the
traditional view that emergent properties cannot be
predicted makes sense: only when we already know
the phenomenon we can guess the appropriate contex-
tual topology necessary to derive the corresponding
phenomenological theory from first principles.
Sixth example:
Temperature is a classical
observable in quantum statistical
mechanics
In phenomenological thermodynamics the concept of
“temperature” is introduced as an equivalence rela-
tion via the zeroth principle of thermodynamics: if
two systems are both in equilibrium with a third sys-
tem then they are in equilibrium with each other.
Since the zeroth law is not a first principle of me-
chanics, temperature is not represented by an intrinsic
observable. However,  it is possible to select a refer-
ence state functional on the context-independent
abstract C*-algebra   A  of intrinsic observables such
that in the associated W*-GNS-representation the
zeroth principle of phenomenological thermody-
namics is fulfilled.
For thermal systems the appropriate reference
states are represented by the so-called KMS-state
functionals, named after the physicists R. Kubo,
P. C. Martin and J. Schwinger.45 They are charac-
terized by strong relaxation and stability properties
with respect to small local perturbations.46 A
GNS-construction with a family of KMS-states as
distinguished reference states on a C*-algebra
  
B ∈Z MKMS KMS( )  without intrinsic classical ob-
servables generates a W*-algebra 
  
MKMS  with a cen-
ter 
  
Z MKMS KMS( )  which contains a classical observ-
able 
  
B ∈MKMS .47 Real-valued parameters in quan-
tum-theoretical descriptions are always values of a
classical observable. Here, the reciprocal absolute
temperature   b  is a spectral value of the classical
45
 Denoting the reciprocal inverse temperature by   b , a
  b-KMS state   rb  of a dynamical system with the C*-alge-bra   A  and the dynamics   h jat t| ∈¤  is characterized by afunction 
  
z F za b ( )  of a complex variable z  on the closed
strip   h jz z∈ ≤ ≤'|0 Im( ) b  such that   z F za b ( )  isbounded and continuous on the closed strip, holomorphic in
the interior of the strip, and satisfies for all   A B, ∈A  and
all   t ∈¤  the two boundary conditions   F t A Btb br a( ) { ( )}=
and   F t i B Atb bb r a( ) { ( ) }+ = . For more details, comparefor example Bratteli & Robinson (1981), section 5.3.1.
46
 Compare Haag, Kastler & Trych-Pohlmeyer
(1974).
47
 This result follows from a theorem by Masamichi
Takesaki (1970).
variable B. This classical temperature observable is
emergent since it belongs to the algebra 
  
MKMS  of
contextual observables but not to the algebra   A  of
intrinsic observables, 
  
B ∈MKMS ,   B A . Moreover,
while all mechanical descriptions are given by so-
called type I W*-algebras, the contextual W*-algebra
  
MKMS  appropriate for the description of thermal
systems is of type III. This fact shows explicitly that
a direct mechanistic description is not possible.
Depending on the choice of the family of contextual
reference states for the GNS-construction we can get
mutually exclusive descriptions of the material real-
ity, either in terms of electrons, atoms and molecules,
or in terms of thermodynamics.
Seventh example:
In quantum theory facts are
generated in an asymptotic
long-time limit
According to the modern point of view, quantum
mechanics is a fundamental theory while classical me-
chanics is a higher level contextual theory of limited
validity. According to this view, a quantum system
(depending on Planck's constant   h ) is called classical
if its algebra of observables is commutative. All
classical quantum systems emerge by breaking the
holistic Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen symmetry. The
still widely held view that classical mechanics is the
limiting case for vanishing Planck’s constant   h  is
untenable. It is easy to prove rigorously by counter-
examples that there is no universal classical limit of
quantum mechanics. That is, the fictitious limit   h → 0
does not exist in the norm topology. Nonetheless it is
possible that for distinguished small families of
quantum states certain quantum systems may behave
exactly as classical systems. In this case, we speak of
classical quantum systems, whose behavior, of course,
depends on the physical value of Planck’s constant   h .
Whether a quantum system behaves classically or not,
is not an intrinsic but a contextual property of the
system. Depending on the context, it is possible to
associate various inequivalent classical quantum sys-
tems to one and the same quantum system.
A family of quantum states is called classical if
this family does not contain any coherent superposi-
tion of its elements. Nontrivial observables which
commute with all observables are called classical
observables. A related notion is the concept of dis-
jointness. Two pure states are called disjoint if there
exists a classical observable such that the expectation
values with respect to these states are different. That
is, mutually disjoint states can be distinguished and
classified in a classical manner. Classically indecom-
posable states are called factor states. More precisely,
a factor state is characterized by the fact that it is dis-
persion-free with respect to every classical observ-
able. Every quantum state can be decomposed unique-
ly into a sum or integral of mutually disjoint factor
states.48 This so-called central decomposition repre-
sents the finest unique decomposition of a nonpure
state into a classical mixture. A classical mixture
allows an ignorance interpretation with respect to
the central decomposition of a nonpure quantum state
into factor states. A factor state is in general nonpure
and allows infinitely many physically different pure
states. Therefore, an ignorance interpretation of a fac-
tor state is not possible. Since in traditional quantum
mechanics all states are factor states, an ignorance
interpretation is inadmissible in traditional quantum
mechanics. The only permissible ignorance interpre-
tation of nonpure quantum states refers to the central
decomposition into a classical mixture of mutually
disjoint factors states.
Processes which produce facts are ubiquitous as ob-
jectively occurring natural processes as well as mea-
suring processes in the laboratory. A fact is an event
in the past which is created by a dynamical process.
Any reasonable statement about such a fact has to be
either true or false, even if we do not know it. This
condition requires a domain of discourse which has a
classical Boolean description. That is, the nonexis-
tence of coherent superpositions of facts is a charac-
teristic property for facts. Therefore, in quantum the-
ory facts are emergent quantities which are gener-
ated by irreversible processes with asymptotically
disjoint final states.49 The notorious “measurement
problem of quantum mechanics” is related to a so-
called insolubility theorem which in its most general
modern version says that an automorphic time evolu-
tion on any C*-algebra cannot generate disjoint
states.50 Even in the very general framework of mod-
ern algebraic quantum theory an automorphic dynam-
ics cannot describe a measurement process which gen-
erates classically different final states in finite time.
However, there exist automorphic time evolutions
which transform an arbitrary initial factor state
48
 For details, compare for example chapter IV.6 in
Takesaki (1979).
49
 Compare also Primas (1997).
50
 Hepp (1972), lemma 2, p.246.
asymptotically into a classical mixture of disjoint
final factor states.
It has been objected that processes with asymptoti-
cally disjoint final states require an infinite mea-
surement time.51 This is a misunderstanding: every
measurement in engineering physics is asymptotic. To
illustrate this situation we consider a customary sta-
tistical decision procedure. In experimental science
all observations have to be considered to be subject to
random variations. The result of a statistical experi-
ment is characterized by a probability measure on
some measurable space   ( , )V S . Consider a statistical
test for deciding whether the state of the apparatus is
given either by the probability measure   ′m  or by the
probability measure   ′′m . Independently of how we
perform this test, the minimal error probability is
given by
  
e ( , )
inf ( ) ( )
′ ′′
′ − ′′ − = − ′ − ′′∈
m m
m m V m mS
:
@ @ @h j 1 __ __
,
where   __ __′ − ′′m m  is Kolmogorov’s variation distance
between   ′m  and   ′′m ,   0 1≤ ′ − ′′ ≤__ __m m .
52
 If the mini-
mal error probability vanishes, a perfect decision can
be made with probability one. Such statistical tests
are called singular. In engineering science, models
which lead to singular decisions problems are con-
sidered as ill-posed and unacceptable.53 If the essen-
tial degrees of freedom of the measuring instrument
are described by a commutative C*-algebra, a classical
quantum state induces a GNS-representation as a
Lebesgue space   L
∞ ( , , )V S m  where the probability
measure   m  represents a classical quantum state. If   ′m
and   ′′m  represent disjoint classical quantum states,
then the two probability measures are singular with
respect to each other,   __ __′ − ′′ =m m 1.
54
 That is, dis-
joint states lead to singular decision problems which
engineers reject as unrealistic idealizations.
Since the quantum states of the apparatus can be
classically described in terms of probability mea-
sures, the well-established distance measure between
probability distributions can be used to introduce a
physically meaningful measure of the approximate
disjointness of two classical quantum states. It is
given by the minimal error probability of the associ-
ated statistical decision problem. In models describ-
ing the measurement process statistically with
asymptotically disjoint final states the effective
51
 For example by Landsman (1995), p.55.
52
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54
 Compare for example theorem 2 on p.82 and theorem 4
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measuring time can be arbitrarily short. For example,
if   ′m ( )t  and   ′′m ( )t  describe two classical quantum
states which become asymptotically disjoint,
  
lim ( ) ( )t t t→ ∞ ′ − ′′ =__ __m m 1, then the error probabil-
ity for a decision at time t  as to which of the two
possible final states   ′ ∞m ( )  and   ′′ ∞m ( )  will asymp-
totically be realized, is given by   1 − ′ − ′′__ __m m( ) ( )t t .
If the threshold level for the error probability is
given by   e < 1, then the effective measuring time   te
is given by   e t te e= − ′ − ′′1 __ __m m( ) ( ) . In the mathe-
matical model for this process the parameters in the
Hamiltonian can be chosen so that for any fixed
threshold level   e > 0  the effective measuring time   te
can be made arbitrarily small.
Contextual ontologies
The problem of the ontology of a scientific theory
refers to the problem of the existence of the postu-
lated entities. An ontic interpretation refers to a the-
ory about things “as they really are”, independently
of any observational or descriptive context. It is not
assumed that an ontic interpretation refers to an
ultimate fundamental theory of matter, but it is to be
understood “relative to one scheme for describing and
explaining physical phenomena.”5 5 On the other
hand, epistemic interpretations refer to our knowl-
edge of observable patterns or modes of reactions of
systems.56 Bernard d’Espagnat defended convinc-
ingly the inevitability of distinguishing between an
independent reality (i.e. independent of our existence)
and the various aspects of empirical reality.57
Fundamental theories are characterized by their
independence of particular contexts and are distin-
guished by their conceptual simplicity. They are sup-
posed to refer to a hypothetical context- and mind-
independent reality. The requested context-indepen-
dence of a fundamental theory precludes its direct
application to concrete problems. This circumstance
corresponds to the fact that the independent reality
cannot be observed directly by our five main senses or
by our instruments. Yet, as argued by d’Espagnat,
“the great mathematical laws of physics may let us
catch some glimpses on the true structure of mind-
independent reality”.58 Experimentally inaccessible
theories are not meaningless but can be used to
generate context-dependent operational theories. A
55
 Putnam (1982), p.4.
56
 Ontic and epistemic formulations have been introduced
by Scheibe (1964), Scheibe (1973).
57 D’Espagnat (1995), chapters 14 and 15.
58
 D’Espagnat (1998), p.15.
fundamental theory of independent reality can be op-
erationalized by specifying a context which describes
our cognitive apparatus or the pattern recognition de-
vices used by the experimentalist. Only by referring
to a specified context one can distinguish between
relevant and irrelevant features. All the richness and
variety of empirical reality manifest themselves only
by abstractions resulting from pattern recognition
devices which determines what is relevant and what is
not. In a mathematically formulated fundamental
theory, a distinction between relevant and irrelevant
features can be accomplished by the introduction of a
new contextual topology which is compatible with
the intrinsic topology of the underlying fundamental
theory.
In the first place, such derived theories refer to our
knowledge of the properties or modes of reactions of
contextual objects as we perceive them. Since every
epistemic description contains a non-removable refer-
ence to the observing tools, the referent of such de-
rived theories is the empirical realty. If the underly-
ing fundamental theory has an ontic interpretation,
the epistemic formulation of a derived context-de-
pendent theory gives rise to a well-defined interpre-
tation: an epistemic state of a derived theory refers
to our partial knowledge of the ontic state of the fun-
damental theory. It is true that the results arising
from empirical investigations depend on the chosen
categorization and the conceptual framework, but a
context-dependent theory derived from a fundamen-
tal theory in an ontic interpretation still reflects
some aspects of the independent reality.
This situation allows us to introduce a consistent
contextual ontology for derived theories: if we agree
on the context, we are entitled to speak about contex-
tual objects as if they were actually existing. For
example, independent of a context it makes no sense
to speak of the moon, of an ammonia molecule, of a
hydrogen atom, or of an electron. But, in everyday life
we take notions like “planets”, “atoms”, “mole-
cules” literally and ontologize them. There are no ob-
jections to do so provided we keep the contextuality
of this ontologization in our mind. It would not be
reasonable (and would contradict common sense and
scientific practice) to assume that there is only one
ontological level, and it would be preposterous if we
were forced to change our beliefs about the ontologi-
cal status of the common-sense world.
A contextual ontology does not refer to an inde-
pendent reality but to emergent properties arising
from latent features of the independent reality. Such
hidden structures become manifest only by choosing a
topology capable to distinguish the relevant and ir-
relevant features. It cannot be a question whether a
particular ontologization is “more true” or “more
real” than another. No single operational description
is uniquely legitimate, and none is sufficient; all of
them together are necessary.59 For example, when a
scientist commits himself to the ontological assump-
tions implicit at the molecular level, his vision of the
world would be severely limited if he would con-
sider, say, the thermodynamic level as derived from
and secondary with respect to the “more real”
molecular phenomena. Of course, if we approach mat-
ter from a molecular point of view, we will get
molecular answers, and our molecular view will be
confirmed. However, questions of a different kind
which cannot be answered within the molecular lan-
guage may be important as well. Only if we maintain
multiple sets of contextual ontologies, we can toler-
ate the coexistence of complementary views in our
experience of reality. While an independent reality
itself is directly inaccessible, the numerous inequiva-
lent contextual descriptions allow us to get deeper
insight into the structure of independent reality.
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